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THE AUTHORITY OF ALLEN V. FLOOD'
N THE case of Allen v. Flood,' one of the Lords asked this
interesting question, "If the cook says to her master, 'Dis-
charge the butler or I leave you,' and the master discharges the
butler, does the butler have an action against the cook?"'  This,
Lord Shand said, was the simplest form in which the very question
in Allen v. Flood could be raised.4 And, like the original question,
it puzzled the judges and Lords very much to answer. Cave, J.
answers,, Yes:-
"Ex concessis, the butler has been interfered with in earning his livelihood
and has lost his situation, and the circumstances shew no just cause or ex-
cuse why the cook should have induced her master to discharge the butler;
... . no good cause or excuse being shewn, though many may be
suggested, it is malicious, and actionable." 2
Lord Herschell answers, No:-
"In my opinion a man cannot be called upon to justify either act or word
merely because it interferes with another's trade or calling; any more than
he is bound to justify or excuse his act or word under any other circum-
stances, unless it be shewn to be in its nature wrongful, and thus to require
justification." 6
These answers fairly represent the divergence of views in Allen
v. Flood, of which it has been said: "The ruling of the majority in
the House of Lords is of extraordinary interest as affecting the
fundamental theory of the Law of Torts. '7 Sir Frederick Pollock
in the 6th English edition of his work on Torts, says: "The chief
alterations . . . are due to what was decided, perhaps. still more
to what was suggested in the House of Lords in . . . Allen v.
Flood, shortly after the publication of the last edition." 8  Chapter
VIII, formerly entitled "Wrongs of Fraud and Malice," has become
"Wrongs of Fraud and Bad Faith," and it is said:-
Since the decision of . . . Allen v. Flood, it seems that in those cases
where the state of mind of the defendant is material, it is not malice in the
popular sense of personal ill will that is the decisive element, but willful or
reckless disregard of truth in some form.' ' Also, "it cannot bean actionable
(1) The objectof this article is to make more available the views set forth in this celebrated
case. and not to discuss the case to any great extent, for that has been done sufficiently. Mr.
Pollock has remarked that when the Lords and judges have spoken, the subject is exhausted
-and we may add in something over 2C0 pages, not always accessible. There has been little
said about it, that is not contained in it; to classify this and make it readily accessible is my
excuse, whether sufficient or not, for this paper. H. L. W.
(2) (1898) A. C. 1-181; 77 L.T. 717-73; 67 L.J.Q. B. 119; 46 W.R. 258; 14 T. L.R.125. Citations fol-
lowing, where nothing but page is given will be from (1898) A. C.
(3) pp. 36, 138-9,165. (4) p. 165. (5) p. 36. (6) p. 138-9. (7) 11 Harv. L. R. 405-6.
(8) Advertisement 6th edition. April. 1901. (9) Torts, 6th Ed. p. 276. citing Lord Herschell.
(1898) A.C. 1. 125, 126; 67 L. J. Q. B 119,185.
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conspiracy for two or more persons, by lawful means, to induce another or
others to do what they are by law free to do, or to abstain from doing what
they are not bound by law to do." "Persuading or inducing a man, without
unlawful means, to do something he has a right to do, though to the preju-
dice of a third person, gives that person no right of action, whatever the
persuader's motive may have been."' "Until this decision, it was current
opinion, supported by a fair show of authority
2 that a special cause of action
exists in Holt, C. J.'s words, where a 'violent or malicious act is done to a
man's occupation, profession or way of gaining a livelihood.' But it must
now be taken that decisions of this kind are grounded on damage to the
plaintiff by reason of trespass, nuisance or some act of the defendant which is
otherwise unlawful in itself; and that in no such case is the cause of action
determined by the presence of 'malice.' ",3
Other material changes are made, based upon this decision.
4
Dr. Bigelow says:-
"In former editions of this book5 it has been stated, in effect, that an
action lies for maliciously procuring one man to refuse to contract with an-
other, if the latter suffered damage thereby; but not without noting that the
doctrine has been denied. The statement was founded upon express decis-
ions both in this country and in England.
6 But in the year 1898, the doc-
trine was repudiated in England, decisions and dicta to the contrary being
reversed or overruled by the House of Lords, and the contrary plainly laid
down."
Mr. Cooke, having suggested "for the first time, as the funda-
mental and universal test of civil liability for an act" as a tort
"whether it is the natural incident or outgrowth of some existing
lawful relation" was gratified "to discover that . . . . in
Allen v. Flood, the majority of the court had reached . . . . an
adumbration of, or approximation to" it.' Mr. Krauthoff in an
address before the American Bar Association says:-
"The logical effect of the recently decided, very great, exceedingly impor-
taut, and highly interesting case of Allen v. Flood, and of the discussions
there had, is to pave the way to consign the expression (malice) to the com-
pany of the host of the merely vituperative expletives with which it was the
habit of the common law pleaders of the past to burden their effusions.II
s
The significance of the facts involved'was as much in contro-
versy as the principles applicable to them. For this reason they
are stated fully:-
(1) Torts, 6th Ed. p. 316. (2) Citing Keeble v. Hickeringill (Holt C.3. 1705) 11 East, 573; Tarle-
ton v. McGawley (1793) 1 Peake 270.
(3) Torts, 6 1d. 317. (4) Compare p. 153, 6th Ed. with p. 180Webb's Ed.; p. 155 with page 182;
pp. 231-2 with p. 285; p. 244 with p. 306; 1). 252 with p. 320; p. 272 with p. 348; pp. 316-7, with
pp. 406-9.
(5) Citing Walker v. Cronin 107 Mass. 555. Cases, 102; Graham v. St. Charles R. R. Co. 27 L.
R. A.(La.) 416; Temperton v. Russell. (1893) 1 Q. B. 715, C. A. Cases 109; Flood v. Jackson, 1U95.
2 Q. B. 21. A. C. (since reversed).
(6) Torts. 7th 1d. p. 115. 235. referring to Alien v. Flood. (7) Law of Trade and Labor Com-
tinations. 1898. by F. H. Cooke, preface p. IV.
(8) L. C. Krauthoff. Malice in Civil Actions, 21 Am. Bar Ass'n Report (1888) p. 338.
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In April, 1894, about forty boiler-makers, or "iron men," were employed
by the Glengall Iron Company in repairing a ship at the company's dock
in Millwall. They were members of the boiler-makers' society, a trade union,
which objected to the employment of shipwrights on iron work. On April
12, the respondents Flood and Taylor, shipwrights, were engaged by the com-
pany in repairing the woodwork of the same ship, but were not doing iron-
work. The boiler-makers, on discovering that these men had shortly before
been employed by Mills & Knight on the Thames in doing iron work on a
ship, became much excited and began to talk of leaving their employment.
One of them, Elliott, telegraphed for the appellant, Allen, the London dele-
gate of the boiler-makers' society. Allen came the 13th, and being told by
Elliott that the iron-men, or some of them, would leave at dinner-time,
replied that if they took the law into their own hands he would use his influ-
ence with the council of the society that they should be deprived of all benefit
from the society and be fined, and that they must wait and see how things
settled. Allen then had an interview with Halkett, the company's manager,
and Edmonds, the foreman, and the result was that the respondents were
discharged at the end of the day by Halkett. Action was brought against
Allen for maliciously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure plaintiffs, pro-
curing and inducing the company to break their contract with the plaintiffs
and not to enter into new contracts with them, and also maliciously, etc.,
intimidating and coercing the plaintiffs to break, etc., and also unlawfully
and maliciously conspiring with others to do the above acts.
At the trial, before Kennedy, J., and a jury, Halkett and Ed-
monds, called for plaintiffs, gave their account of the interview
with Allen :'-
Mr. Halkett:-
Allen said, "He had received word from some of the boiler-makers that
were working in our yard that they wanted to see him, and he came round
and had an interview with these men, and they told him that we had two
shipwrights engaged in our employment who were known to have done iron
work before in Mills & Knight's yard, and that unless these two men were
discharged from our employment that day, all the iron workers belonging to
his society would leave off work that day; and they gave as the only reason
that these men were guilty of doing iron work in Mills & Knight's yard.
* The substance of what he said was that they were really trying to
put an end to this practice of doing iron work by the shipwrights-to stop
shipwrights being engaged in iron work. That it was not from any ill feeling
against ourselves nor against any men in particular,-Flood and Taylor; but
they-that is, the boiler-makers-had made up their minds-that whenever
it is known that any shipwrights have been engaged doing iron work, their
workmen-that is, the boiler-makers-would cease work on the same ship on
the same employment."
(Q.) "Did he say anything in regard to Flood and Taylor in respect of
other yards besides yours?"-(A.) "Not in a particular sense; in a general
sense, these men would be followed-that these men were known-it was so
(1) The testimony of these two witnesses is given here as nearly as possible in theirown
language as set forth in Lord Halsbury's opinion. 1898, A. C. 69.
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difficult to get them known, that these men were known, and wherever these
men were employed the same action would be taken there as had been taken
in our place." He also said: "You have no option. If you continue to en-
gage these men our men will leave. . . . It was in consequence of that
that the men were discharged. It was the fear of the threat being carried
out--of the men leaving-the boiler-makers. If the boiler-makers had left
or had been called out, it would seriously have impeded our business.
The threat to withdraw these iron workers extended to every workman we
had in our employment at whatever place." He goes on, "The threat was to
withdraw the iron workers in the employment of the company from every
ship or every job upon which the company were engaged on which the men
of their union were employed."
Mr. Edmonds testified:-
"Mr. Halkett sent for me and when I got in the room he said, 'Mr. Allen
has come here and says that if those two men,' that is, Flood and Taylor,-
'are not discharged all of the iron men will knock off work or be called out.'
I will not be sure what term he used. I asked Mr. Allen the reason why.
He said because those two men had been working at Mills & Knight on
iron work. I told him I thought it was very arbitrary on his part to do
anything like that. I told him I thought it was not right that Mills &
Knight's sins should be visited upon us." (Q.) "Did anything else take
place?"-(A.) "For the reason that we were not employing the shipwrights
on iron work, and never had done so--not at the Glengall. . . He says
that was the case, and if these men were not discharged, their men would be
called out or 'knock off'-I will not be sure what term he used." (Q.) "Was
anything said about other yards?"-(A.) "Yes. When I spoke about it not
being right to visit Mills & Knight's sins on us, he said the men would
be called out from any yard they went to-they would not be allowed to work
anywhere in London river."
On the part of the defendant, Elliott,' who sent for Allen, testi-
fied:-
"We were having a talk together at breakfast time, and some of them
felt dissatisfied about it. Some of them said we had better leave our work.
I said, 'Do not do anything of the kind.' . . . I sent a telegram to
Allen. . . . When I met Mr. Allen at breakfast time next morning he
said tome, 'Well, what is this here little bit of a trouble here?' 'Well, I
said, the chaps are dissatisfied about these here two plaintiffs Flood and
Taylor being in the habit of working over at Mills & Knight's.' "Well,' he
said, 'what do you want?' 'Some of them are saying they are going to leave
their work.' He says, 'The best thing you can do is to go in and tell them
not to leave their work until things are settled, wait and see how things
settle.' I said, 'Very good. I will tell them what you say now.
On cross examination:-
(Q.) "Their (some of the men's) wishes were that these men whose con-
duct they objected to at Mills & Knight's should not be kept in the same
employ -with themselves?-(A.) Oh, no. (Q.) That was the feeling, was it
(1) This is taken from Lord Halsbury's quotations from the testimony 1898, A.1c. 81.
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not?-(A.)No. (P.) Well, let me understand.- (A.) They did not say they
should not be kept in the employ of the firm at all. (Q.) They did not say
they should not be kept on the job on which they were being employed?-
(A.) They did not wish them among our midst. (Q.) Working on the
same ship?-(A.) Yes."
Upon this point, it is stated in the opinion in the court below'
that:-
"Soon after the repairs to the ship were commenced the iron workers held
a meeting and resolved that they would not work in the same yard with the
plaintiffs, and that they would leave the work unless the plaintiffs were
removed."
The boiler-makers' society rules provided :2_
"Should a dispute arise in any shop or yard, the members of that shop oi
yard shall make' the same known to the nearest branch. The officers of such
branch shall try and settle such dispute; but should a dispute arise in any
shop or yard which cannot be amicably settled by the branch or district com-
mittee, it shallbe referred to the executive council, who will give instructions
on the subject."
In his testimony, Allen stated in reference to this rule :3-
"In minor cases the executive council leave things to my discretion; I con-
sidered this a minor case." "I do not in cases of minor disputes refer to my
committee." And in answer to the question whether he wishedthe two men
to be discharged, when he had his interview with Halkett, he said, "He had
no such thought floating in his mind atthe time.
' 4
Kennedy, J. ruled5 that there was no evidence of conspiracy, or
of intimidation, or coercion, or of breach of contract, Flood and
Taylor having been engaged on the terms that they might be dis-
charged at any time. In the ordinary course, their employment
would have continued till the repairs were finished or the work
slackened.
-In reply to questions put by Kennedy, J. the jury found that
Allen maliciously induced the Glengall Company (1) to discharge
Flood and Taylor from their employment; (2) not to re-engage
them; (3) that each plaintiff had suffered 620 damages; and (4)
that the settlement of the dispute was a matter within Allen's dis-
cretion. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs for £40. This
decision was unanimously affirmed by the Court of Appeal.' Allen
brought this appeal. It was argued four days, before seven lords,7
and again six days, eight judgess having been summoned to attend,
(1) L. R. 1895, 2Q. B. 21. on 22. (2) Ib. 32. (3) Ib. 32. (4) 1898 A. C. 82. (5) 1898 A C. 3. 4.
(6) L R. 1895, 2 Q. B. 21 (Lord usher, M. R, Lopes and Rigby, L. J, each delivering opin-
ions).
(7) Lord Halsbury, A. C., and Lords Watson, Herschell. Macnaghten, Morris, Shand, and
Davey.
(8) Hawkins Mathew. Cave, North. Wills, Grantham. Lawrance and Wright. J3.
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and before the same Lords, with two others.' At the close of the
arguments this question was propounded to the judges: "Assum-
ing the evidence given by the plaintiffs' witnesses to be correct,
was there any evidence of a cause of action fit to be left to the
jury?"
The judges desired time to consider, and on June 3, 1897, deliv-
ered opinions. Six2 answered Yes;* and two, 3 No.
The House took time for consideration'-till December 14, 1897,
when opinions were read by Lord Halsbury, r. C.,' Lords Ash-
bourne,' and Morris7 for affirmance; Lords Watson, 8 Herschell,'
Macnaghten, 0 Shand," Davey,12 and James of Hereford, 3 for re-
versal.
It appears, therefore, that of the twenty-one judges and the jury
whose opinions were given in the case, the jury and thirteen of the
judges were in favor of the plaintiffs; the decision, however, of the
six out of the nine members of the House of Lords determined the
case in favor of the defendant, and apparently fixed the law of Eng-
land; for, a few months later, the same court held that "An erro-
neous decision binds the House, and can be set right only by an
Act of Parliament." 14
Where there is so much diversity, the weight of the decision
must rest upon the intrinsic merit of the opinions pronounced. A
summary of these is, therefore, given-those of the majority of the
House of Lords, first.
LORD WATSON:" I. Assumes" that the verdict found the
company discharged plaintiffs and did not re-employ them; they
were induced to do so by the acts of the defendant; the defendant
maliciously induced the company's act; and the company's act was
wholly legal.' 7
II. Malice: The whole pith is in 'malicious,' that is, a wrongful
act done knowingly, with a view to injurious consequences; 18 a
wrongful act is an invasion of the civil rights of another; malice
depends not upon the motive which influenced the mind of the
actor, but upon the illegal character of the act which he contem-
plated and committed;'" the object of an act, that is, the result which
will necessarily or naturally follow from the circumstances in which
(1) Iords Ashbourne. and James of Hereford.
(2) Hawkins, (A. C. 24); Cave. (A. C. 37); North, (A. C. 44); Wills, (A. C. 51); Grantham.
(A; C. 58). and Lawrance, (A. C. 58. 62). (3) Mathew, (A. C. 24, 28); Wright, (A. C. 62. 67)
(4) A. C. 67. (5) A. C. 67-90. (6) A. C. 109-114.) (7) A. C. 154-60. (8) A. C. 90-109. (9) A. C. 114-142.
(10) A. C. 143-154. (11) A. C. 160-69. (12.) A. C. 169-175. (13) A. C. 175-181.
(14) London Street Tramway Co. v. London County Council, [1898] A. C. 375.
(15) A. C. p. 90. (16) p. 91.
(17) p. 92. (18) p. 92. (19) p. 94. 4
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it is committed, may give it a wrongful character, but it ought not
to be confounded with the motive.'
The jury in their finding that the company was maliciously
induced by the defendant, meant to affirm that defendant was influ-
enced by bad motive, an intention to injure plaintiffs in their trade
and calling.
2
As to crimes the rule may be different, but the law of Ingland
does not take into account motive as constituting an element of a
civil wrong; 3 if it did, one who committed an act not in itself ille-
gal, but damaging to several, would incur liability to those he
intended to injure, and not to others; a master who discharged a
day to day servant because he disliked him and desired to punish
him would be liable, and likewise the servant who left for the same
reason.
4
The authorities are all cases either of, 1, Arivilege, where the act
per se constituted a legal wrong but was protected from usual con-
sequences by an honest desire to perform a public or private duty;
or, 2, cases in which the act was a plain violation of a private
right; or, 3, cases in which an act detrimental to others but afford-
ing no remedy against the immediate actor, had been procured by
illegal means.' Garret v. 7aylor, and Zarleton v. McGawley,7 are
of the last class: Lumley v. Gye,8 and Bowen v. Hall' are of class
2; and the first branch of Temperton v. Russell"0 is the same as
Lumley v. Gye, and the second branch was clearly of class 3, the
injury being an unlawful conspiracy - a clear ground of liability.
III. Procuring act of another, when a wrong: According to the
majority decision in Lumley v. Gye, a person who by illegal means,
that is, means which in themselves are in the nature of civil wrongs,
procures the lawful act of another, which act is calculated to injure
and does injure a party, commits a wrong for which he may be
made answerable."
One who procures the act of another is liable, when he know-
ingly, for his own ends, induces the other to commit an action-
able wrong." When the act induced is within the right of the imme-
diate actor, and is not wrongful, the inducer is liable if he uses
illegal means directed against the third party; the illegal means must
be in the nature of Civil wrongs. 13
IV. Wrong alleged: There were no illegal means used; there was
no coercion; coercion must, irrespective of motive, be a wrongful
Ip. 102. 2p.94. 3 p. 92.
4 p. 100. 
5
p. 104. 6Cro. Jac. 567. 7 1Peake, N.P.C. 270. 8 2 U1.& B. 216. 960. B.D. 333.
10 f1893] 1 Q. B. 715. 11 p. 97. 1"p. 96. 1 p. 97.
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act;' it is the absolute right of every workman to exercise his option
as to persons for whom he will work.2 The boilermakers would have
left if plaintiffs had continued. 3 They would have been acting
within their own right had they done so.4 They were entitled to
inform the company of the step contemplated, and the reasons,
by their own mouth, or by Allen.' Giving such information did
not coerce the employers.' The employers simply followed their
own interests,' and the judge charged that there was no evidence of
conspiracy, intimidation or coercion in a legal sense.8
LoRD HrRscnPLL:' I. It was not contended that merely to
induce the company to cease employing the plaintiff would consti-
tute a legal wrong, but it was said to do so because the person
inducing them acted maliciously."
II. Malice: It is certainly a general rule that an actprima facie law-
ful is not unlawful on account of the motive with which it is done."
If the acts are or are not actionable according as malice is present
or not, it is essential to define it: no greater danger can be imagined
than to leave it to the jury; no one would know what his rights
are." Malice means a wrongful act done intentionally without just
cause or excuse,-this eliminates motive altogether. It includes
wrongful act intentionally done." Conspiracy is anomalous,"' and
malicious prosecution an exception."
III. Differs from breach of contract: There was no contract
broken; and there is a chasm between inducing one to break a con-
tract and inducing one not to enter into a contract." One is in vio-
lation of a legal right for which the person doing the act which
injured the plaintiff could be sued, as well as the person who pro-
cured it;" in the other case no legal right is violated by the person
who did the act from which the plaintiff suffers." If the latter were
actionable, it would follow that every person who induces another
not to enter into any contract with a third person may be sued by
that third person if the object were to benefit himself at the expense
of such third person." The motive of injuring one's neighbor or of
benefiting himself at his expense is as old as human nature. It
must for centuries have moved men in endless instances to do or to
refrain from doing particular acts." The fact that under such cir-
cumstances no authority for an action founded on these elements
has been discovered, goes far to show that such an action cannot be
maintained."
Ip. 98. 2 p. 98. 3p.99. 4 p.99. 5 p.99. 'p. 99. 7p.99. 8 p. 100. 0p. 114. 10p. 118.
11 p. 123. 12 p. 118. 3 p. 124. 14 p. 124. 1 p. 125. 1" p. 121. 17 p. 121. I8 p. 121.
19 p. 126. 28 p. 128. 21 p. 128.
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IV. The wrongful act alleged: There was no threat. I admit that
fear of personal violence is not necessary to constitute threats,
menaces, intimidation or coercion.1 I am quite unable to conceive
how the plaintiffs can have a cause of action because instead of the
iron workers leaving, either of their own motion or because they
were called out, there was an intimation beforehand that either the
one or the other of these courses would be pursued.2 It is admittecd
that the defendant had no personal spite against the plaintiffs.' The
object was at the utmost to prevent them in the future from doing
work which he thought was not within their province, but within
that of the ironworkers.' If defendant had acted the same when
the plaintiffs were engaged upon iron work his motive would have
been precisely the same, and the result the same.'
V. The right involved: I do not doubt that every one has a
right to pursue his trade or employment without molestation or
obstruction, if these terms imply some act in itself wiongoul.' If
it is intended to assert that an act not otherwise wrongful always
becomes so if it interferes with another's trade or employment, and
needs to be excused or justified, such a proposition has no solid foun-
dation in reason to rest upon.7 A man's right not to work, or not to
pursue a particular trade or calling, or to determine when or where
or with whom he will work, is in law of precisely the same nature
and entitled to just the same protection as a man's trade or work.8
They are examples of the wider right that every one has, to do any
lawful act he pleases without molestation or obstruction, and em-
brace the right of free speech. 9  A man has a right to say what
he pleases to induce, to advise, to command, provided he does not
slander or deceive or commit any of the other wrongs known to the
the law, of which speech may be the medium.1"
LORD MACNAGHTrN :" I. Findings of the juiy: That Allen
maliciously induced the company to discharge the plaintiffs.' 2  I do
not know what the jury meant by 'induced' ; nor by 'maliciously';
and I doubt whether I quite understand those unhappy expressions
myself. 4 They must mean, however, that Allen induced the com-
pany to discharge the plaintiffs by representing to the manager, not
otherwise than in accordance with the truth, the state of feelings in
the yard, and the intentions of the workmen;1" and that he did so
maliciously, because he must have known what the result of his
1 p. 128. 2 p. 130. 3 p. 131. 4 p. 131. 5 p. 131. 6 p. 138. 7 p. 138. 8 p. 138.
9 P. 138. 10 P. 138. 11 p. 143. 12p. 143. 13 p. 143. 14 p. 144. 16 p. 150.
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communication would be, and perhaps was not sorry to see an
example made of persons obnoxious to his union.'
II. Such conduct is not actionable-not wrongful: No action
would lie against the company for discharging the plaintiffs;' nor
against the men for striking against them; 3 nor against the officers
of the union for sanctioning a strike.4  Allen happened to be the
medium of communication between the iron men and the company
-the most innocent of them, for he neither set the agitation on
foot nor did anything to increase it.' There was nothing wrong in
going where he was sent for; nothing wrong in telling the manager
that the iron men would leave unless the shipwrights were dis-
missed, if he believed that that was what they intended to do.
They were free to leave at any time, for any reason, or no reason,
or a bad reason; any one might have gone alone, or all together, if
peaceably, and said they would not work with plaintiffs.6
III. Not the cause of the loss: Allen's order did not put an end to
the employment; the result would have been the same if Edmonds
had told Halkett what was going on, or if Flood had told it himself.' I
do not think it can be said that "Allen did 'induce' the company to
discharge the plaintiffs. Certainly it cannot be truly said that he
procured the company from continuing to employ them. If the whole
story had been a fiction, and an invention on his part, I could have
understood the finding of the jury.8 I do not think there was any
misrepresentation on Allen's part. I do not think there was any
exaggeration, nor was such a point made at the trial. 9 Evidence of
plaintiffs proves that the iron men were in a very nasty state; they
believed that the iron men meant mischief. Edmonds thought
Allen 'had only to hold up his hand and the whole of the men
would go off.' It is plain what it was that induced Mr. Halkett to
discharge the plaintiffs. it was nothing that originated with Allen.
It was no misrepresentation on his part. It was not fear of his per-
sonal influence. It was simply a very natural, desire for peace and
quiet.""1
IV. Nothing short of unlawful acts would be actionable. There is
no foundation in good sense or authority that a person who suffers
loss by reason of another's doing or not doing some act which that
other is entitled to do or to abstain from doing at his own will or
pleasure, whatever his real motive may be, has any remedy against
any third person who by persuasion or some other means not
Ip. 150. 2p. 151. 3p.151. 4 p. 151. 5p. 151. 'pp. 148-9.
7p. 151. S. p. 149. 9 p. 149. 10 pp. 149-50. 11 p. 150.
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in itself unlawful has brought about the act or omission, even
though he was actuated by malice, and was without justification
or excuse." 
I
The case may be different where the act itself to which the loss is
traceable involves some breach of contract or some breach of duty,
and amounts to an interference with legal rights; there the immedi-
ate agent is liable, and it may well be that the person in the
background who pulls the strings is liable too.
2
V. Malice will not make the act wrongful, If the immediate
agent cannot be made liable, though he knows what he is about,
and what the consequences of the action will be, it is difficult to see
on what principle a person less directly connected with the offence
can be made responsible unless malice has the effect of converting
an act not in itself illegal or improper into an actionable wrong.
3
If that is the effect of malice, why is the immediate agent to
escape? 4 Suppose a man makes a transfer of a debt with which he
has no concern for the purpose of ruining the debtor; or declines to
give his servant a character because he is offended with him for leav-
ing; or a person of position takes away his custom from a trades-
man merely to injure him, on a fancied grievance not connected
with their dealings,-or not content with taking away his own cus-
tom, says something not slanderous or otherwise actionable to
induce his friend not to deal any more with the tradesman. There
is no liability for taking away his own custom. Is it possible that
the one can be made liable for inducing the other not to employ the
person against whom he has a grudge? 5 These all belong to morals,
rather than to law, and self interest and public opinion are the best
safeguards. An inquisition into motives in such cases would be
intolerable. 6 - What I say here "can have no bearing on any case
which involves the element of oj55ressive combination," since boycot-
ting, and other forms of oppressive combinations, depend upon
considerations conspicuously absent here.7
LORD SHAND :" I. Facts: There was no contract, but the employ-
ment would have continued, if employers had not been induced to
discontinue it by the representations made to them by Allen.9 There
was no exaggeration or misrefiresentation of the condition in the
yard.1" Allen was not actuated by malice in the popular sense of
ill will,-he did not even know the plaintiffs." There were no threats.
Threats to be actionable must be "threats of violence, intimidation,
'p.1
5
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4
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obstruction or the like,"-threats which may be described as men-
aces which improperly affect freedom of action in the person who is
induced to act or to refrain from acting.' The boiler-makers were
entitled to resolve they would not work then or in the future with
the plaintiffs ;2 also to inform their employers that they had done
so. 3  Allen was only doing what was right and proper in intimating
this resolution to the employers, rather than allowing them to quit
without notice. 4 There was no threat of the nature of menace so as
to amount to the use of illegal means to induce the employers to act
-no threat to do anything beyond the exercise of their legal
rights.5
II. Rights of filainztifgs: The plaintiffs were entitled to pursue
their trade as workmen without hindrance.
6 This right was qualified
by an equal right, or the same right on the part of the' workmen.'
The hindrance must not be unlawful, nor by unlawful acts.
8
III. Rizhts of defendant: Amongst the rights of all workmen is
the right of competiion.0 In the like manner and to the same
extent as a workman has a right to pursue his work or labor with-
out hindrance, a trader has the right to trade without hindrance.
0
That right is subject to the rights of others to trade also, and to
subject him to competition which is itself lawful, and cannot be
complained of where no unlawful means have been employed.
1 The
judgment in the Mogul case
1 determined this, it seems to me, and
also held that the exercise of any legal right in the course of com-
petition in labor or in trade does not become illegal because it is
prompted by a motive which is improper or even malicious."= The
case was one of competition in labor;14 the defendant was bent, and
bent exclusiyely on the object of furthering the interests of those he
represented. This was the motive of his action, and not a desire to
"do mischief to the plaintiffs in their lawful calling." I-
IV. Contract: I reserve my opinion, as do Lord Hershell and
Lord Macnaghten, in case defendant had induced one to break a
contract,-as in cases of Lumley v. Gye,
16 Bowen v. Hall," and
Temfierton v. Russell. 8  There is ground for consideration that
only the person who breaks the contract is liable.
LoRD DAvrZY. 1  I. Findings: The jury have found that Allen
maliciously induced the company to discharge the plaintiffs; mal-
iciously induced the company not to engage them further, to their
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damage of 20 pounds each;1 malice was intended to be used in
the sense of intending to do mischief to plaintiffs; 2 there was no
evidence of conspiracy, or intimidation, or coercion in any legal
sense of the term.
3
The Court of Appeal seems to hold that damnum absque injuria,
if accompanied by malicious intent, will give a right of action, or
that malicious motive per se amounts to or may in certain cir-
cumstances amount to injuria. I am unable to assent to this.
4
II. Malice, in its legal sense, means a wrongful act, done in-
tentionally, without just cause or excuse. If so, it seems to be an
argument in a circle to say that an act not otherwise wrongful
becomes so if malicious.'
III. Plaintiffs had no r'ght: A man has no right to be employed
by any particular employer, and has no right to any particular
employment if it depends upon the will of another. 9  The right
which a man has to pursue his trade or calling is qualified by the
equal right of others to do the same, and compete with him, though
to his damage.' It is obvious that a general abstract right of this
character stands on a different footing from such a private particu-
lar right as the right to the performance of a contract.8
IV. Differs from rzHht to contract. There is a legal difference
between persuasion to break a contract and persuasion not to enter
into a contract.8 In the former, if the persuasion is successful, the
other party is deprived of the benefit of having the contract com-
pleted. tO In the latter, he loses nothing to which he has a legal
right, and he has no legal ground of complaint against one who
refuses to contract with him." In the one case there is the viola-
tion of a right; in the other, not.'2 For the present purpose I accept
without comment, 3 the doctrine of Lumley v. Gye," and Bowen v.
Hall."
V. Emfiloyer's rigzt,-flroximate cause: An employer may dis-
charge a workman with whom he has no contract, or may refuse to
employ one, from the most mistaken, capricious, malicious or mor-
ally reprehensible motive that can be conceived, but the workman
has no right of action against him."8 It seems strange to say that
the principal who does the act is under no liability, but the acces-
sory who has advised him to do so, without any otherwise wrong-
ful act, is under liability."7 This is not a case of conspiracy, whether
that would make any difference or not.'$
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VI. The authorities. The cases cited do not hold otherwise.
In every one of them there was either violence or the threat of
violence, obstruction of the highway, or the access to the plain-
tiff's premises, nuisance, or other unlawful acts, done to the
damage of the plaintiff.1 Nor is the gist of the action in the cases,
that plaintiff was a trader, or exercised a profitable calling; that
circumstance afforded evidence of damage.
2  I suppose that if a
person obstructed the access to my house or my vessel by molesting
and firing guns at persons resorting thither on their lawful occasions,
I may have my action against him, though I do not keep a school, or
am not a trader, but am sailing my yacht for my own pleasure; or
if a person obstructs my free use of the highway, and I suffer
damage thereby, I have a right of action, though my carriage does
not ply for hire. 3 I think Keeble v. Hickeringill
4 was decided on
the ground that the act was a wilful disturbance of the enjoyment
of the plaintiff of his own land for a lawful and profitable purpose,
and was a nuisance.1
VII. Fraudulent refiresentations: It was urged that Allen was
guilty of wilful misrepresentation in what he told Halkett-that the
men never really intended to strike, and Allen knowingly exceeded
his instructions.6 Such a state of facts, amounting to fraud, would
have constituted a legal wrong, and have been the essence of the
action! It therefore should have been pleaded.
8  It is a question
of fact and should have been submitted to the jury.' It is not in
the pleadings, was not urged at the trial, was inconsiftent with
the charge against the other defendants below, and was not referred
to by the trial judge in his summing up, and not raised by counsel
until the argument in the House of Lords.'
LoD JAMZS op HI-RFORD :" I. Facts assumed: In consequence
of Allen's communication to the company, the company determined
to discontinue the employment of plaintiffs; this determination was
arrived at in order to avoid the inconvenience that would arise
if the boiler-makers quit work. 1 The company committed no un-
lawful act; no contract was broken; there was simply a refusal to
renew a hiring, that is, to enter into a new contract.
3
II. Defendant's acts not wrongful: There was no coercion or
intimidation (within the legal meaning) of the company, by the
defendant.' He informed the company of the existing, preformed
intention of the boiler-makers;" that intention was formed before
I p. 173. 2 p. 173. 3 p. 173. 4 11 East, 573. - p. 174. 9 p. 174-5. 7 p. 175. 8 p. 175.
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he came, and not in consequence of anything that he said or did;' he
was only communicating this preformed intention; merely warning
the company.' He doubtless desired that the boiler-makers should
execute iron work, that steps should be taken to secure it, and so
naturally would use solicitation and persuasion to procure plaintiffs'
non -employment. 3
III. Aol tMe firoximate cause: For him to communicate the boiler -
makers' intention to the company did not injure plaintiffs.4 The
boiler-makers would have acted upon it whether the company
knew or were ignorant of their intention.' They were about to
desert their work when the defendant by his threat prevented them
from doing so, and prevailed upon them to give him an opportunity
to communicate with the company.' He took a very minor part,
and if he had never appeared the injury would have been the same,
for the company would have discontinued plaintiffs' services to
secure those of the boiler-makers.7
IV. Wrongful acts only are actionable: Only an interference
which is itself unlawful constitutes a cause of action. I think the
cases cited establish no more than this.8 If Lord Esher's principles
laid down in Bowen v. Hall0 and TemPleton v. Russell'
"Merely to persuade a person to break his contract may not be wrongful,
in law or in fact * * * But if persuasion be used for the indirect purpose of
injuring the plaintiff, or of benefiting the defendant at the expense of the
plaintiff, it is a malicious act, which is in fact and in law a wrong act, and
therefore a wrongful act, and therefore an actionable act, if injury ensues
from it,"
were applied to the ordinary affairs of life, great inconvenience
would ensue." Every competitor who alleged that he was the best
person to fulfill an offer would be liable to an action. 2 An architect
says:- "My plans are best, and following them will make the best
house at the least cost; therefore employ me, and not A. or B."
This would be actionable by the dicta in Bowen v. Hall,' for his
object is clearly to benefit himself at the expense of such third
person.'4
V. Here interferences not wrongful: But 'interfered with ' in its
legal sense should be defined also." Everyman's business is liable
to be 'interfered with' by the action of another, and yet no action
lies for such interference. Competition represents 'interference,'
yet it is in the interest of the community that it should exist." A
Ip. 177. 2 p. 178. 3 p. 178.
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new invention 'interferes with' (even destroys) an old trade.'
The boiler-makers' conduct here interfered with plaintiffs' busi-
ness, but it is not said an action lies against them.' Every organ-
izer of a strike for higher wages 'interferes with' the employer,
and every employers' federation that persuades a co-employer to
lock out his workmen 'interferes with' them--but neither is action-
able.3
VI. Interferene with trade not actionable. I see no ground for
saying that any different rule should be applied to cases of interfer-
ence with a man when carrying on his trade or business, than when
he is engaged in any other pursuit.
4 In the Mogul case,5 though
an extreme case of interference directly injuring plaintiffs' trade,
for the express purpose of benefiting the defendants', it was held
that the acts were those of competition, were not unlawful, and
there was no conspiracy. 6
The views of the judges who held with the majority of the Lords
may be summarized as follows :-
MA.Hzw, J.: Defendant is charged with malice in law, that is with wrong-
jul conduct which violated a right of the plaintiffs.
7 In the charge of malice
in law, personal malevolence is not necessarily imputed.
8 It is most import-
ant to bear in mind that it was admitted on the trial that there was no ground
for charging the defendant with having acted with any ill will to the plaint-
iffs. 9 Although this was admitted in the trial court, the Court of Appeal con-
sidered that the jury might find the act of the defendant had been mal-
icious.10 But motive is immaterial unless a right of plaintiff is infringed.
Defendant is charged with having acted wrongfully and unlawfully with the
object and result that the plaintiffs were deprived of a right to follow their
trade and earn wages. Is there such a right? 1
2 This did not arise from a
contract-no right of that kind was infringed. If there is a right to labor, it
is admitted to be limited by fair competition; by any one refusing to employ;
by the right to give advice not to employ.
13 But it is said that after making
these allowances, the balance of such a right is specially protected. No author-
ity is cited for the rule; it is strange such a right should have been dormant
so long; no reason is given why other persons' contracts should not be like-
wise protected; but if they were; extraordinary results would follow ;-the
question of whether advice was properly given would have to be left to the
jury, for which they are altogether unfit.
14 There is no authority that the
right is like a property right-many cases were cited, but none are appli-
cabl 0 6. There can be no right to have that which no one is bound to provide,
namely, employment in his trade or business. It seems equally clear that he
cannot be said to have a right to the hope of such employment.
10
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WRIGHT, J.:1 Apart from malice, was there any cause of action? No.2
"The foundation of every action of tort, apart from the question of malice
is an act wrongful, and which may be qualified legally as an injury. It is
essential to an action in tort that the act complained of should under the cir-
cumstances be legally wrongful, as regards the party complaining, that is, it
must prejudicially affect him in some legal right; merely that it will, how-
ever, directly do him harm in his interests is not enough."
3
Was there evidence of malice, and if so in what sense? No, in the legal
sense. Yes, in the popular sense. 4 Since there was not otherwise any wrong,
or injuria, it follows that there could not be malice in the ordinary legal sense
of the term, as "the willful infringement of alegal right or a breach of a legal
duty without matter of legal justification or excuse." In this sense, in a
statement of a cause of action, or a crime, "it imports not an inference of motive
to be found by the jury, but a conclusion of law which follows on a finding
that the defendant has violated a right and has done so knowingly, unless he
shows some overriding justification,I '-as in law of murder, and libel, and
malicious prosecution." 5 The only kind of malice, therefore, which can be
suggested in the present case is malice in its popular sense, importing a
malicious motive, spite, and ill will. It seems to me impossible to say that
there was not evidence fit to be left to the jury, ol -malice in this sense."6
Can the addition of malicious motive create an injuria? No. "An act
which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is
done with a bad intent." 
7
The views of the minority were:-
LORD HAsBURY, L. C.8 I. Assumfition: There was no con-
tract by which the company were bound to keep the plaintiffs in
their service till the repairs were completed. 0
II. Plaintiffs' righ t: Plaintiffs have a right to employ their labor
as they will, recognized by law, and guarded from any undue inter-
ference as an actionable wrong."0 Very early authorities recognize
this right, and no authority can be found which questions or quali-
fies it." It is indeed part of that freedom from restraint, that liberty
of action, which in my view may be found running through the
principles of our law. 1 It is "the liberty of a man's mindand will,
to say how he shall bestow himself and his means, his talents and
his industry," and is " as much a subject of the law's protection as
is that of his body." 1 An action for the infringement of such a
right is not a novelty, and if it were, it would be no sufficient argu-
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III. Wrongs to such a righzt: "Intimidation, obstruction, and
molestation are forbidden; so is intentional procurement of a viola-
tion of individual tights, contractual or other, assuming always
there is no just cause for it."' "Intentionally to do that which in
the ordinary course of events is calculated to do, and does damage,
is actionable if done without just cause or excuse," 2 -per Lord
Bowen, in the Mogul case.3
IV. Tue defendant's acts were wrongful. They amounted to
threals. "To my mind, Allen was guilty of intimidation, and coer-
cion, through that intimidation :" 4 "I do not use 'intimidation' in
the technical sense of the statutes (where it is construed along with
associated words), because I observe the judge instructed the jury
there was no intimidation in a legal sense.-' If what was meant by
that was that there was no threat of violence to person or property,
it is true.6  But the judge left the exact question to the jury, 'If
you find he induced the company by the threat, which is suggested
by tMe filaintiffs, of calling out all tie men on the strike,' did he do
it maliciously, etc.?' If that which was held out as the induce -
ment to dismiss the plaintiffs was that such a stoppage of the works
should be occasioned as that the business of the company would
seriously suffer, I should think that would be a thing which would
be likely to produce fear of the consequences of the company retain-
ing them in their employment, and a company which abstained from
doing so by reason of that fear would justly be described as ' intim-
idated.' "
V. They were malicious: Intentional action done without just cause
or excuse is what the law calls a malicious wrong.9 Objection is
made that 'maliciously' adds nothing; if the thing was lawful, it
was lawful absolutely; if not lawful, it was unlawful, and malicious
can make no difference. The fallacy is in the assumption that
everything must be absolutely lawful, or absolutely unlawful.
There are many things that become lawful or unlawful according to
the circumstances. There is no analogy between the case of a man's
digging into his own land and diverting the subterranean water to
the flow of which his neighbor has no right, and the intentional
inflicting of injury upon another person's property, reputation or
lawfuloccupation." The word 'malicious' appears to me to negative
I .74. citing Mogul Case. 23 Q. B. D. 614, per Lord Bowen.
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just cause or excuse.' No better illustration can be given of the dis -
tinction between an act which can be legally done and an act which
cannot be so done because tainted with malice, than such a colloquy
as might have been held in a case of this kind. "If the representative
of the men had, in good faith and without indirect motive, pointed
out the inconvenience that might result from having two sets of men
working together on the same ship, whose views upon the particular
question were so diverse that it would be inexpedient to bring them
together, no one could have complained; but if his object was to
punish the men belonging to another union because on some former
occasion they had worked upon an iron ship, it seems to me that
the difference of motive may make the whole difference between the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of what they did." 2
VI. Allen misrebresented the facts: It was not necessary to set this,
forth in the pleadings, for it is not an action for false representa-
tions, but for maliciously and wrongfully causing the discharge of
the plaintiffs. It is not necessary to set forth the unlawful means
when there is an unlawful procuring.3 "If concerted collective
action to enforce, by ruining the men's employment, the will of a
large number of men upon a minority, whether the minority con -
sists of a small or a large number, be a cause of action where the
actual damage is produced, it would seem to be a very singular
result that an individual who falsely assumes the character of repre-
senting a large body, uses the name of that large body to give force
and support to the threat which he utters, and so produces the
injury, could shield himself by proving he had no authority." 4 "It
might as well be contended that the highwayman was not respons-
ible for the coercion he exercised toward his victim if he puts a
pistol to his head because it should afterwards turn out that the
pistol was unloaded." -
VII. The defendant's wrongful act was the proximate cause of the
damage to the tlaintiffs. "In the face of the evidence, how any one
can doubt that it was the communication made by Allen that caused
the dismissal of these two men, I am not able to understand. I
shall assume as proved, or at all events as established by evidence
proper to be submitted to the jury, that it was Allen who caused
the dismissal of the plaintiffs.0 That the company was acting within
their legal rights makes no difference-the question is what was
the cause of their thus exercising their legal right? I have never
heard that a man who was dismissed from his service by reason of
Ip. 84. 2 pp. 84-5. 3 p. 88. 4 p. 87. 5 P.89. 6 P.T71.
THE AUTHORITY OF ALLEN V. FLOOD
some slander could not maintain an action against the slanderer
because the master had a legal right to discharge him." 1 The dis-
satisfaction of the boiler-makers has been greatly exaggerated-the
evidence called it a "little bit of a trouble," "some of the men felt
dissatisfied," "some said we had better leave," or "are going to
leave;" but Allen said: "Tell them not to leave work until things
are settled; wait and see how things settle." 2
VIII. Changes the law: The adverse views overrule the views of
the most distinguished judges going back now for certainly two
hundred years, and up to this time there wasan unanimous consens-
us of opinion; and in denying a remedy we are departing from the
principles which have hitherto guided our courts in the preservation
of individual liberty to all.3
LoRD ASHBOURNI: I. Plaintiffs' right: Plaintiffs had a clear
right to pursue their lawful calling, to have the full benefit of their
employment, and the right to enjoy the legitimate, reasonable and
probable expectation of a continuance of it.5 The law is so stated
by Sir Win. rle, 6 and Holt, C. J., in Keeble v. Hickeing-ill 
7
says: " He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable
to an action for doing so." No subsequent case has thrown doubt
upon the effect of that authority. Tarleton v. MfcGawley8 supports
it as a settled law; the Mogul case9 accepted it as undoubted law,
and only held that fair competition did not violate the right.
II. Defendant's acts were wrongful: It was not an effort, by
competition, to enable the boiler-makers to get the iron work
instead, but to fiunish the plaintiffs; the motive was founded upon
the determination to inflict punishment on them for their past
action, by driving them out of their employment.,' There was evi-
dence to go to the jury that the defendant intimidated and coerced
or maliciously induced the company's action." I would gather
from the defendant's evidence that he would not say his acts were
right.
-12
III. The defendant's acts were the firoximate cause of the loss.
There is no question that they damaged the plaintiffs. The natural
result of the defendant's words and intervention would be that the
plaintiffs would not then or in the future be free to carry on their
trade, even confining themselves to" wood-work. The fact that
plaintiffs could make no claim against the company, cannot exon-
Ip. 74. 2 p. 81, 3 p. 9. 4 p. 109.
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erate the defendant from his own wrongful act.' In. Temperton v.
Russell 2 Lord Esher gave itas his opinion that there was no real
difference between a malicious inducement to break a contract and
a malicious inducement not to enter into new contracts of service.
The consequences to the workmen so treated are alike disastrous.3
The object of the wrongdoer is the same in each case.
4
IV. As to malice, I can add nothing to what was said by Lord
Halsbury, in whose opinion I fully concur.
LORD MORRIS.6 I. Plaintiffs' right: At common law a work-
man had a ?izht to work with any person who was willing to em-
ploy him. Both had a right to trade in labor as in any other com-
modity as they thought fit. This was a part of the personal liberty
enjoyed by every man, and like personal liberty was the subject of
peculiar safeguards,-it was inalienable, could not be bartered
away, and contracts restraining it were (with certain exceptions)
null and void. Its existence was established as far back as Queen
Anne, 7  in Keeble v. Hickeringill,8 which has never been dissented
from and in the Mogul Case9 in the Appeal Court, Lord Bowen
cites it with approval, and in the same case in this Houselo three
(Lord Bramwell, Lord Macnaghten, and Lord Field) of the seven
Lords pronouncing opinions, refer to it with approval, and none
expressed any disapproval or adverse criticism of it.
II. Wrongs to such a right: "In my opinion it is actionable to
disturb a man in his business by procuring the determination of a
contract at will; or by even preventing the formation of a contract,
when the motive is malicious and damage ensues." "1
III. Defendant's acts were wrongful: His object was to injure-
the plaintiffs and to Punish them, and he had the intention of fur-
tlier Persecuting, them by not allowing them to work anywhere,
and this was not the wish of the men or their union.'" His conduct
was unauthorized, and he misrefiresented to the employers both the
wishes of the men and their objects, and acted outside the scope of
his authority as a district delegate of the union. The jury found
it so. 1. Kennedy, J. in his charge put Allen's case thus:
"Bearing in mind how Allen came, you have to consider whether
the plaintiffs have Proved to you not merely that he represented to
the emfiloyers what the men working in that yard would be likely
to do unless they could come to some settlement, and left to the
I p. 114.,. 1893 1 Q. B. 715.
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employers . . . the choice of action. I do not think in that
case you would say that was an inducement.' Or that "he felt
himself in this position: I am a district delegate; in the interest
of the employers . . as well as of the men, it is better
that I should go and tell the employers what the facts are after tell-
ing the men to take no hurried action-to let the matter either be
settled peaceably by the employers, or if it cannot be settled by
them be brought in due course before the executive of the union."I
2. Some of your lordships have put yourselves in the place of the
jury by coming to the conclusion that Allen had gone to the em-
ployers merely to intimate as has been said, or represent to them
the feelings and views of the men, to be their messenger or mouth-
piece,-that being the very case that was negatived by the jury.2
Indeed Lord James has gone further and said, for Allen to com-
municate such intention to the company did not injure the respond-
ents. If this was correct, there was no necessity to go any further. 3
3. In my opinion it was for the jury to say whether Allen went to
the employers as peacemaker, intimator, representative, messenger,
or mouthpiece, as was stated by him, or rather for him by some of
your Lordshifis, or whether he went with the object and for the
purpose of having the plaintiffs punished for past alleged offenses
by getting them discharged at once from their employment. 4 4.
The defendant did not take, in his evidence, the position taken up
for him by some of your Lordships. He was conscious he had
done wrong, and denied altogether what Mr. Halkett proved. The
jury disbelieved him. 5
The views of the six judges who held for plaintiff may be added:
I. Thw plaintigs' right. All the judges except those of the Court of Ap-
peal (all of whom assumed the plaintiff had a right that could be invaded),
quoted with approval Lord Holt's words in Keeble v. Hickerfngill, given
above. Ilawklins, 7 Cave,8 and North, 9 JJ., as well as Lords Halsbury,"0 Ash-
bourne," Morris,' 2 all quoted with approval the following from Sir William
:rle.' 13
"]Svery person has a right under the law as between him and his fellow
subjects to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or his own capital ac-
cording to his own will. It follows that every other person is subject to the
correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to
the fullest exercise of this right which can be made compatible with the ex-
ercise of similar rights by others. Every act causing obstruction to another
in the exercise of the right comprised within this description, done, not in
the exercise of the actor's own right, but for the purpose of obstruction
- I p. 158. 2 p. 159.
3 p. 159. 4 p. 159 5p. 159. 611 Bast573. 7 p. 14. 8 p. 36. 9 p. 39. 0p. 39. 11p. 112.
12 p. 156 13 Trade Unions. p. 12. 5
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would, if damage should be caused thereby to the party obstructed, be a vio-
lation of this prohibition, and the violation of this prohibition by a single
person is a wrong to be remedied either by action or by indictment, as the
case may be."
Hawkins says' further that a component part of this right is "the right to
the full benefit of that valuable interest, which Lord Ellenborough termed a
'probable expectation' (as distinguished from a vested legal interest)," upon
which the daily laborer may rely for continual employment in the future...
It is analogous to the good will of a business. Cave reviewed the cases
2
fully.
II. Wrongs to such rights. Lawrance stated these most succinctly as fol-
lows: 3 -- "I think the principles on which the case is to be decided are to be
found in the dicta of Holt, C. J. in the case of Keeble v. Hikeringill,4 as
above given. The conditions necessary to support the action are' "trespass,
violence, fraud, or breach of contract; or any direct tort or violation of any
right of the plaintiffs, like the case of firing to frighten birds from a decoy,
or any act, the ultimate object of which is to injure the plaintiffs, having its
origin in malice or ill will to them." Hawkins adds: "Any menacing ac-
tion or language . . . which no man of ordinary firmness . . . can
reasonably be expected to resist, used . . with intent to destroy" his
freedom of will, "and to compel him through fear of such menaces to do
what it is not his will to do," and "calculated to cause injury to him or to
some other person," is sufficient.0
III. Wrongful nature of the defendant's acts:-The judges generally con-
sidered them wrongful both to the employers and to the plaintiffs.
Threats, or coercion of the entloyers. Kennedy, though ruling there was no
evidence of intimidation or coercion in a legal sense, called defendant's acts
threats.7 Lord 1sher, 8 and Hawkins, 9 North,1 0 and Grantham," did the same.
Cave waived the question as unnecessary.12  Hawkins says if the defendant's
acts were "not coercion, . . . I do not know what coercion is."1 3 Gran-
tham adds there could be "no better evidence of intimidation of the em-
ployer. 1 4
Desire to piuniish. A determination to prevent further employment and to
punish the plaintiffs,-'procure discharge,' 1 ' 'forcing company not to employ
them,' 16 'make an example of,"17 'followed,' 8 'not be allowed to work any-
where on London river,'1 ' 'deprive them of their means of living,' 2 0 'as a
warning to others,' 2 ' 'inflict upon them great loss and suffering,' 22 'for what
they had done.' 23 Nearly all characterized the acts so.
I p. 16. 2 1410, Schoolmaster's Case, Y. B. 11 Hen. IV, fo. 47 pl. 21; 1593, Levet's Case, Cro.
nliz. 289; 1620, Garret v. Taylor, Cro. Jac. 567; 1661, Sheperd v. Wakeman, 1 Sid. 79; 1706, Keeble
v. Hickeringill, 11 East 573 n.; 11 Mod. 74, 130; 3 Salk. 9; Holt 14, 17, 19; 1794, Tarleton ,. M c-
Gawley, 1 Peake, N. P. C. 270; 1809, Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East571; 1824, Hannam v. Mockett,
2 B. & C. 934; 183.5, Green v. Button 2 C., M. & R. 707; 1844, Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick. 6
M. & G. 953; 1853, Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & B. 216; 1862, Young v. Macrae, 3B. & S. 264; 1876,
Riding v. Smith, 1 x. D. 91; 1881, Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333; 1883, Quartz Hill lin. Co. v.
Iyre. 11 Q. B. D. 674; 1889, Mogul Case, 23 Q. B. D. 598; 1893, Temperton V. Russell, 1 Q. B. 715-
Western Counties Manure Co. . .Lawes, L. R. 9 Ex. 218; Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577.
3 p. 58. 4 11 East 573. ' Quoting Lord Bramwell in Mogul Steamship Co. y. McGregor
[1892] A. C. 25. 6 p. 17.
7 pp. 82,83. 8 (1895) 2 Q. B. 37(C.A.). 9 pp. 17&18. 1op. 39. 
11
p. 53. 12 p. 37. 13 p. 13.
14 p. 53. Isp. 36. 16 p. 39, 42. 17 p. 45. 1' pp. 38,39,42. 10 pp. 37,39, 42, 53. 20 p. 45. 1 p.
45, 48. 22 pp. 21, 48. 23 p. 39.
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Were not fair competition. Cave says, "according to the Mogul case
the action of Allen might have been justified" as trade competition, if it had
been confined to the time when respondents were doing iron work, and were
therefore acting in competition with the boiler-makers. . . . As soon as
he overstepped those limits, and induced their employers to dismiss them by
way of punishment, his action was without just cause or excuse, and conse-
quently malicious. . . . If this is not malicious, I ask where the line is
to be drawn? Might Allen lawfully have carried out his threat, and with
impunity have procured the dismissal of the respondents from every yard in
London by way of punishment, and not in the way of competition?"' And
Grantham speaks similarly.
2
They were malicious: The jury found them so, and thirteen judges
approved their finding. Nearly all the twenty-one judges approved the
definition of malice as being "a wrongful act done intentionally without just
cause or excuse;" but of this, North said: "If the proposition intended is
that an act itself legal cannot be rendered actionable by being done from a
wrong motive, such as spite or ill will or vindictiveness, or merely to vex or
annoy, I-deny that the proposition is sound in law or universally true. It is
much too large. 1each case must be considered separately." ' 3 All agreed
that there were acts in which the motive was immaterial, like digging in
one's land; and others in which, like malicious prosecution, it was essential.
Of the six judges, all except Cave4 urged that there was a class of rights
which would be invaded by a malicious act not otherwise wrongful, if there
were no just cause or excuse for it, if damage resulted, and that the defend-
ant's act was one of that kind. All agreed that the malice here consisted of
the desire "to punish the plaintiffs;" all held it was present; and though
",spite or ill will," is not necessary "there is evidence of its existence here," 6
"ample materials," 0 "about as strong a proof of malice as can be found in
any case reported in our law books," 7 and "evidence of malice of the worst
form towards the plaintiffs." 8
Misrepresentations by the defendant: There was evidence for "the jury
that the men had no intention to leave, that the defendant could not
have believed that they had, but that the firm intention of both was to re-
main, and to drive out the plaintiffs, and that the assertions made to Mr.
Halkett were falsely made for the purpose of intimidation."" "There was
malicious conduct and falsehood on the part of the defendant.""' It was
"strong evidence of malice to tell the company that the men were about to
strike, when he had himself informed them that not only would a strike not
be permitted . . . but that the men would be fined for so doing." By
that "fraudulent statement he induced the company to discharge the men." '
IV. Proximate Cause: All the six judges agreed that Allen's acts were
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss; and indeed all who held for the
plaintiff must have found so. "There are numerous cases shewing clearly
that a wrongful interference between employer and employed, from which
damage ensues, gives a cause of action, even where the employment is at
will only, and not for a fixed period. The real question is whether Allen
I p.:37. 2 p . 54.
3 p. 40. 4 p. 29. 5 p. 18, Hawldns, J. 0 p. 42, North 3. 7 p. 53, Grantham. J.
8 p. 53, Grantham. J. 
8
pp. 22-23. Hawkins, J. 
1
0 p. 56, Grantham, 3. 11 p. 61, Lawrance, J.
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did or did not wrongfully interfere with the existing relation and the
duration of the employment is immaterial except on a question of the
amount of damages;' "the loss and damage are the same as if they had
had a contract with the company," except they would have then had some
remedy against it, 'while now they have none; why should an invalid
contract because not written or stamped "give immunity to one who induces
its breach?"
2
To sum up: When a person sues another and obtains judgment,
some things have necessarily been found. These are, that the plain-
tiff had the right claimed,=- R; that this right has been infringed
and damage done, =D; that the defendant's act was wrongful, and
proximately caused the damage, =W; and so we might say
R- (W-+D) = a cause of action. If either of these elements is ab -
sent, there can be no recovery. Confining ourselves to the prevail-
ing views expressed we have:
As to D, all admitted its presence,-the plaintiff had sustained
temporal loss.
As to R,-Mathew, J.,' Lord Herschell4 and Lord Davey' held
that plaintiffs had no legally protectible right under the circum-
stances; if this is so, what was further said as to malice, by these,
was unnecessary to the decision. All the rest of the Lords and
Judges, however, recognized that the plaintiff had a legally protec-
tible right of some kind.
As to firoximale cause,-waiving all questions as to the character
of the defendant's acts,-Lord Macnaghten,I Lord James 7 and Lord
Herschell clearly held that the defendant's acts were not the prox-
imate cause of the plaintiffs' loss; if so, what they said as to malice
becomes immaterial; Lord Watson' is not clear upon this point,
but intimates that defendant's acts did not do the injury to the
plaintiffs in the legal sense.
As to W, if defendant's acts were rightful, that is, wholly in-
nocent as having no morally wrongful quality at all, and neither the
character of a trespass nor fraud, nor negligence, then it would not
be actionable,-all the 21 Judges and Lords substantially agreed to,
this. Lord Watsono said defendant had the absolute right to do
what was done. Lord Herschelln seems to consider that defend-
ant's acts were acts of fair competition and not wrongful for. that
reason; and Lord Shand" clearly holds this. Lord Macnaghten" and
I North, J. p. 43. citing, 1859, Thompson v. Ross, 5 H. and N. 16; 1787, Bennett v. Allcott, 2 T_
Rt. 166: 1867, Evans v. Walton. L. R. 2 C. P. 615 (citing fullv the old cases). 2 p. 35. Cave, J.
$ p. 27. 4 p. 121; 5 p. 173. 6 pp. 149-52. 7 pp. 176-178. 8 pp. 118, 131-2. 9 pp. 98-99. 10 pp.98-99-
11 pp. 117. 131. 12 pp. 163-4. 13 pp. 149-151.
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Lord James' looked upon them as wholly innocent and almost com-
mended Allen for "warning the company's representative not to
pursue a course which would be detrimental to the company's in-
terest"- a view sufficiently answered by Lord Morris.2
If the foregoing is correct, what becomes of what the six Lords
say upon the subject of malice? Upon the most simple and obvious
principles, the majority would have decided the same way without
discussing malice at all,-Lords Davey and Herschell because there
was no right; Lord Macnaghten, Lord Herschell and Lord James,
because the acts of defendant were not the proximate cause of
the loss; Lord Watson, that the defendant had an absolute right;
Lord Shand, that the acts were those of fair competition, and clearly
within the principles of the Mogul case, and Lords Macnaghten and
James, that the acts were innocent, accidental or commendable.
These are all,-and the long discussions as to malice would seem
to be little more than fulmination against the unfortunate and un-
necessary dictum of Lord Esher (Brett, L. J.) in Bowen v. Hall'
given above. Wright, J.'s theory of the case was the only one
that required a holding that malice made no difference.4
The above summary comes to much the same result so well ex-
pressed by Lord Lindley, in Quinn v. Lealfam, that the majority
of the Lords in Allen v. Flood, found the "defendant had infringed
no right of the plaintiffs; had done nothing which he had no legal
right to do; and that the fact that he acted maliciously and with
intent to injure the plaintiff did not, without more, entitle the
plaintiffs to maintain an action."
Expressions of approval and disapproval have been as divergent
as were the original opinions of the judges. "Probably no prece-
dent exists in which their Lordships overruled such a preponder-
ance of judicial decision and opinion as existed" hereA "Politics
took sides, perhaps involuntarily," and as in Lord Brougham's
time, " the decisions of English judges could be predicted from
their political leanings."'
"The House of Lords never deserved better of the Common
Law; " "it will make the law broader and simpler;" "it is one of
the rare leading decisions whose effects are not fully worked out
for many years.' "That it-is simple, convenient in practice,
and in accord with a conservative view of the spirit of the Coin-
1 1. 178. 2pp. 158-9. 6 Q. B. D. 333 [1881], Ames Cases Torts 613. 4 p. 64.
[1901] A. C. 495 on p. 533. G 14L. T. R. 126.- 7 Law Times, Dec. 18 and 25, 1897. 814 L. 0. R.
107. 129.
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mon Law, seems almost undeniable.' "Time will demonstrate
the correctness of the decision." 2 It affirms "well settled prin-
ciples of the Common Law.' '3 It overthrows "a rule which con-
ferred a most dangerous power upon courts and juries." '1
In England it has been cited and approved, on some point, in six
cases.' In Canada it has been followed in two cases,6 and has
overruled there the civil law rule that one could not on his own
land do something "merely to hurl others," "a pure act of malice.' '"
Lord Halsbury's criticism that it overruled the holdings of two
hundred years is noted above. Lord Morris remarked it "over-
turns the overwhelming judicial opinion of Englandf " 8
In Scotland, "malice and motive have been more considered
. than is consistent with . . . Allen v. Flood. "o And
in the Irish Queen's Bench Division, in Leatham v. Craig," An-
drews, J., says "the final decision has been regarded by many emi-
nent judges as going very much too far;"' 1  O'Brien, J., thought
there were "several fallacies scattered through the argument of the
majority,"" and Palles, C. B. said "I feel myself coerced by the.
judgment . . . to hold that the law is powerless to protect
from that which the jury has found to be the tyranny of a trades
union, the sacred right of a workman to save himself and his family
from starvation by the work of his hands."' It was held here and
unanimously affirmed by the Irish Court of Appeal, that "notwith-
standing Allen v. Flood, an action was sustainable by the plaintiff
against the defendants for maliciously conspiAng to procure breaches
of contract, and also for maliciously consfiirin,- together to injure
him by Preventing Persons from entering into contracts with him. ' 14
The case was then taken to the House of Lords, and unanimously
affirmed by Earl Halsbury, L. C., Lord Macnaghten, Lord Shand,
Lord Brampton, Lord Robertson, and Lord Lindley,-the syllabus15
saying "Allen v. lood explained, and its real effect stated,"
affirming Temferlon v. Russell,'6 and holding--
1 11 Harv. L. R. 405-6. 2 17 Law Notes, Jan. 17, 1898, as quoted by Mr. Krauthoff, 21
Am. Bar Assn. R. 384. 3 18 Can. L. T. 123. 4 London Times, as quoted by Mr. Krauthoff, 21
Am. Bar Assn. Rept. p. 384. 5 Huttley v. Simmons, L. R. [1898] 1 Q. B. 181: Ajello v. Wors-
ley, L. R. [1898] 1 Ch. 274;:Lyons v. Wilkins, [1898] 78 L. T. R. 618, 619; Hubbuck, etc. v. Wil-
kinson [1898], 79 L, T. R., 429; Boots, etc., v. Grundy (1900) 82 L. T. R. 769 on 772. 6 Per-
rault v. Gauthier, 28 Can. Sup. Ct. R. 241; McBryan v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. 29 Sup. Ct. R,
359. 7 29 Sup. Ct. R. 359, on 372. 8 p. 184. 9 Scottish Codperation, etc., Soc. v. Glasgow Flesh
ers' Assn. [1898] 35 Sc. 1. R. 645, Lord Kincairney. 10 [1899] 2 Irish R. 667. 11 lb. 676'
12 lb. 14, 686, 690, 691.
'3 [1899] 2 Ir. R. 701. 14 11899] 2 Ir. R. 667, Syllabus. 15 Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] A. C. 495
16 [1893] 1 Q. B. 715.
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. "A combination of two or more, without justification or excuse to injure a
man in his trade by inducing his customers or servants to break their con-
tracts to deal with him or continue in his employment, is, if it results in dam-
ages to him, actionable."
Lord Macnaghten distinguishes this from Allen v. Flood in that
there was no trade dispute, and an "oppressive combination" differs
widely from an "invasion of civil rights by a single individual."
Lord Shand,- that a combination not for legitimate competition
"but in pursuit of a malicious purpose to injure another, would be
clearly unlawful." Lord Brampton says3 "It must not, however,
be supposed that a malicious intention can in no case be material
to the maintenance of an action." Lord Lindley 4 suggested that
Allen v. Flood "only applies to 'acts otherwise lawful,' i. e., to
acts involving no breach of duty, or in other words, no wrong to
any one," and adds "it is a very valuable decision, but it may be
easily misunderstood and carried too far."5, If these statements
are correct, then all the difficulties as to malice are likely to arise
when the acts of two or more persons are considered instead of one.
In this country soon after the decision of Allen v. Flood, it was
said: -
"There have been so many decisions holding defendants liable for what
courts consider malicious interference with the plaintiff's business that it
seems probable that the judges will pay little or no respect to it, beyond dis-
tinguishing it as without the element of conspiracy which has been present
in all of theAmerican cases."S
And now since Quinn v. Lealham7 the English rule is so. The
case has been cited several times. In Illinois, 8 as not applying
where an existing contract was involved. In Massachusetts,'
Holmes, J., says:-
"I regard it as settled in this Commonwealth, and as rightly settled,
whether it be consistent with some dicta in Allen v. filood or not, that an
action will lie for depriving a man of custom, that is, possible contracts, as
well when the result is effected by persuasion as when it is accomplished by
fraud or force, if the harm is effected simply from malevolence, and without
some justifiable cause, such as competition in trade."1 0 And again, "When the
employment is at will, the fact that the employer is free from liability for
discharging the plaintiff does not carry with it immunity to the defendant
who has controlled the employer's action to the plaintiff's harm. The no-
1 [1901] A. C. 511.
2 [19011 A. C. 512. 3 [1901] A. C. 524. 4 [1901] A. C. 52--4. 5 [1901] A. C.542. 0 11 Harvard
L.R. 405-6. 7 [1901] A. C 495. 8 Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 605, 618.
0 (I98) May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11 on 14. 10 CitingWalker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555,556; Mo-
rasse v. Brochu, 151 Mass. 567; Hartnett v. Plumbers' Supply Ass'n, 169 Mass. 229, 235; Delz v.
Winfree, 60 Tex. 400, 405; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 91, 69, 105.
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tion that the employer's immunity must be a non-conductor so far as any
remoter liability was concerned troubled some of the judges in Allen v. Flood,
but is disposed of for this Commonwealth." I
Hammond, J., says, "We are not disposed, in view of the cir-
cumstances under which that decision was made, to follow it. We
prefer the view expressed by the dissenting judges.'
In Michigan, Grant, C. J., says "To other courts than those o.f
England, it is mainly instructive in the learned and exhaustive
opinions rendered.' In New York, it has been followed in six
cases4 in the Supreme Court, and according to newspaper reports,
very recently by the Court of Appeals;' but Rumsey, J., says "it
cannot be sustained either upon principle or authority.' 6 In Wis-
consin,, Marshall, J., says of the three English cases, the Mogul
case,' Allen v. Flood,' and Huilley v. Simmons "-"If the doctrine
of these cases as settled in the last of 'them is to prevail, we must
all revise our notions of the law of conspiracy and the books must
be rewritten, "--and "there is very little in Allen v. Plood to war-
rant adopting it." It has been cited in the rederal Courts a few
times, but not with entire approval.
An editorial in the American Law Review " says of the case:-
"The element of motive can no more be eliminated from the civil law of
torts than it can from the law of crimes. A thousand such decisions as that
rendered in the case of Allen v. Flood could not accomplish such a result.
The argument that it presents an element of uncertainty in jury trials is an
argument that may be made with even greater force in criminal cases. In
a civil trial, property or money . . . is at stake. . . . The whole
gist of murder is malice. Let us take an infamous case, the monument of
which can be seen any day upon the top of Knob Hill in San Francisco,
where a rich man wanted to build a palatial residence. An undertaker had
a small lot within the tract which this multi-millionaire desired to
purchase. He refused to sell except for a good price, and the multi-
millionaire refused to buy, and instead exercised the right which the
barbarism of the Common Law has conceded to land owners-the right to
erect a wall on his own land, let us say twenty feet high-so high as to
shut out light and prospect from that lot and render it worthless. And
there that erection stands, a monument to the doctrine of Allen v. Flood
which in that respect was held to be the doctrine of the common law by the
1 [1901] Moran v. Dunpby,177 Mass. 493. on 487. 2 [1900] Plant v. Woods.176 Mass. 492 on 499.
3 [18981 Beck v. Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, on 528-9. 4 Davis v. United ]Zngineers,
28 App. Div. 396 on 399, 401-2; Coons v. Chrystie [19981 24 Miscl. 296. Bischoff, 3. at 298; Rey-
nolds v. Plumbers' Ass'n [1900] 30 Miscl. 709, Davy, 3.; National Protective Ass'n v. Cum-
ming, [1900] 23 App. Div. 227, McLaughlin J., p. 232; Ingraham, 3. p. 236; Wunch v.
Shankland [19011 59 App. Div. 482, Williams, 3.; Collins v. Am. News Co. (1901], 34 Miscl. 260,
Gilchrist, J.. 6 National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63N. E. Rep. 369. 6 28
App. Div. 396 on 399. 7 Staterv. Huevin [19011, 110 Wis. 1S9, 263. 823 Q. B. D. 598, [1892] A, C. 25.
9 [1898A.c.. 1[1898] I Q. B. 181. 11 32 Am. L. R. 905-7 [1898].
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judiciary of California. Will any fair minded man say that that ought to be
the law? . . No rule of law can maintain a foothold which is so
opposed to natural justice, and which so outrages the conscience of
mankind."
As Dr. Freund suggests, "it is almost certain that the decision
does not conclude the development of this phase of the law."'
In all this merry war, the cook and butler have not been lost
sight of; for besides Cave, J., and Lord Herschell, Grantham, J.,.
and Lord Shand3 championed the one or the other. And in this
country, Dr. Freund4 and Mr. Eddy i have taken up the cause. So
far as I know, however, the case is yet undecided and unreported.
H. L. WII.GUS.
ll Harv. L. R. 449,464. 2 p. 57. 3pp. 165.6. 4 11 Harv. r,. R. 449, 461. 1.4ddyon Combina-
tions. Vol. I, p. 401, note.
